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BRIEF OF APPELLEE
Appellee, K. Norman Cox, Defendant, submits the

following

brief of Appellee in this matter.
I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW.
In divorce proceedings, this Court may not disturb the trial

court's

determinations,

discretion.

absent

a

showing

of

clear

abuse

of

Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314, 1317 (Ut. App. 1990) .

Additionally, this Court must place a presumption of validity upon
the trial court's actions.
(Ut. 1985) .

Berger v. Berger, 713 P.2d 695, 697

Cummings v. Cummings, 821 P.2d 472 (Utah App. 1991) .

The burden of proof is on Plaintiff to show error or absence
of discretion, and this Court may only overturn the trial court's
Findings

of

Fact

if

they

are

clearly

erroneous—that

is, the

evidence clearly preponderates to the contrary and is against the
clear weight of evidence, or unless the Court reaches a definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.

Dunn v. Dunn,

802 P.2d at 1317.
Moreover, even where the trial court has failed to enter
findings on all material issues, if the facts in the record are
clear, uncontroverted, and capable of supporting a finding in favor
of the trial court's judgment, the trial court's judgment will not
be disturbed on appeal.

Hardy v. Hardy, 776 P. 2d 917, 924 (Ut.

App. 1989).
II.

STATEMENT OF FACTS.
The facts set forth below were established by the testimony

and

evidence

presented

at

trial

on August

31, 1992, and

the

Decision and Findings of Fact of the Honorable Lynn W. Davis,

s:\mbf\l5102

District Court Judge for the Fourth Judicial District Court for
Utah County, State of Utah.
1.
years.

Plaintiff and Defendant were married for fewer than three
The parties were married for 29 months, from July 1, 1988,

to their separation on December 1, 1990.

(Findings of Fact, p. 2,

par. 3; Judge Davis7 Decision, pp. 4, 14; Trial Transcript, p. 60,
11. 4-11," p. 145, 11. 2-5).
2.

Plaintiff and Defendant were older in years, both parties

had been married before, and no children were born as issue of the
marriage.

At the time of their marriage, Appellant was 4 7 years of

age and Respondent was 56. This was Plaintiff's third marriage and
Defendant's second marriage.
Judge Davis 7

(Findings of Fact, p. 2, par. 4;

Decision, pp. 4-14; Trial Transcript, p. 59, 11.

17-25, p. 60, 11. 15-17, p. 144, 11. 13-19, p. 145, 11. 6-8).
3.

Defendant brought his unencumbered premarital home into

the marriage.

In 1966, Defendant and his deceased former wife

built a house in Orem, Utah.

Defendant paid off a 2 0-year VA

mortgage on the home sometime in 1987.

As of the date of the

parties' marriage on July 1, 1988, the home and property were
unencumbered by mortgage or lien.

(Findings of Fact, p. 2, par. 5;

Judge Davis' Decision, pp. 7, 14; Trial Transcript, pp. 142-143,
11. 1-25, 1-8) .
4.

Plaintiff's remodeling expenditures did not increase the

value of Defendant's premarital home.

The parties

stipulated

before trial that the value of Respondent's home prior to marriage
and prior to remodeling was $77,000.00.

The Court determined that

at the date of separation the fair market value of Defendant's
premarital home was $105,000.00. Plaintiff contributed $12,562.65.
s:\mbf\15102
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The court determined that award as follows: $18,062.65 contributed
by Plaintiff minus $5,500.00 reimbursed to Plaintiff by Defendant.
Defendant contributed $11,931.00 towards remodeling

Defendant's

home.

The value of Respondent's premarital home in 1988 plus the

amount

the parties paid toward the remodeling, or a total of

$106,993.65, exceeds the $105,000.00 fair market value of the home.
(Findings of Fact, p. 3, par. 7, pp. 4-5, par. 12-13; Judge Davis'
Decision, pp. 4, 7, 16-17).
5.

Prior

premarital

to

the parties' marriage,

residence

against

the advice

brother-in-law, an accountant.

Plaintiff

of Defendant

sold

her

and

her

In June 1988, against the advice of

Defendant and Plaintiff's accountant, Plaintiff sold her personal
residence

to

her

parents,

Smith

and

Lee

Jacobs.

From

the

$21,000.00 proceeds received from that sale, Plaintiff repaid her
parents the $18,000.00 she had borrowed from them to purchase the
home.

(Findings of Fact, p. 3, par. 6; Judge Davis' Decision, p.

7; Trial Transcript, pp. 145-146, 11. 9-25, 1-14).
6.
home

Defendant intended to protect his separate premarital

under

the

provisions

of

an

Antenuptial

Agreement,

and

Plaintiff had knowledge of and acquiesced to Defendants intent.
At Plaintiff's behest, the parties met with Plaintiff's attorney on
or about June 23, 1988.
knowledge

that

Defendant

At this time, Plaintiff's attorney had
was

represented

by

counsel.

(Trial

Transcript, p. 107, 11. 6-21, p. 113, 11. 23-25, p. 114, 11. 4-8,
p. 148, 11. 4-6.)
Agreement

so that it required the signatures of Plaintiff

Plaintiff's
attorney.
s:\mbf\15102

Plaintiff's attorney drafted an Antinuptual

attorney

and

the

signatures

of

Defendant

and

and
his

(Trial Transcript, p. 98, 11. 21-25, p. 99, 11. 1-5, p.
3

114, 11. 11-16).

Plaintiff executed the Antenuptial Agreement on

June 28, 1988, and Defendant executed the Antenuptial Agreement on
June 30, 1988.

Defendant

intended for his premarital assets,

including his premarital home, to be protected under the provisions
of the Antenuptial Agreement, and Plaintiff admitted at trial that
she had knowledge of Defendant's intent to protect his premarital
home.

This fact was substantiated by the testimony of Plaintiff's

attorney at trial.

(Findings of Fact, p. 3, par. 8; Judge Davis'

Decision, p. 6; Transcript, p. 70, 11. 6-11, p. 72, 11. 12-15, p.
126, 11. 20-22, p. 130, 11. 3-7, p. 130-131, 11. 23-24, 1-6, p.
151-152, 11. 15-25, 1-4, p. 157, 11. 8-13).
7.

Defendant intended the Warranty Deed to secure only the

amount of Plaintiff's remodeling expenditures.

Nearly contempora-

neous with the parties' signing of the Antenuptial

Agreement,

Defendant executed a joint deed to his premarital home and placed
Plaintiff's name on the title to the home intending to secure
monies Plaintiff paid or would pay toward the remodeling of the
home.

At no time was Defendant's attorney present at any of the

meetings held between the parties and Plaintiff's attorney, nor did
Plaintiff's attorney send the Warranty Deed to Defendant's attorney
for his review.

Moreover, at no time did Plaintiff's attorney

confer with Defendant's attorney regarding the propriety of placing
Plaintiff's name on the title to Defendant's unencumbered home.
(Findings of Fact, pp. 3-4, par. 9-10; Judge Davis' Decision, pp.
6-7, 16; Trial Transcript, p. 115, 11. 1-4, 8-11, p. 131, 11.
18-20, p. 201, 11. 10-23).
8.

Plaintiff has been employed at all times relevant hereto,

while Defendant has been unemployed since October, 1991.
s:\mbf\l5102
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Plaintiff

has continuously been employed by Brigham Young University in a
secretarial position since the parties were married on July 1,
1988.

Plaintiff's gross monthly income as of September 1992 was

$1,850.00.

By comparison, Defendant has been unemployed since he

sold his business in October 1991, and his only income as of trial
was $554.00 per month from unemployment compensation.
9.

Defendant

suffers

from

a

physical

disability

precludes him from seeking full-time employment
training.

Defendant

suffers

which

in his area of

from a physical disability

which

necessitated recent knee operations. It is expected that Defendant
will be immobilized for six months, and Defendant's disability will
preclude him from seeking full-time employment
training—auto-body repair.

in his area of

(Findings of Fact, p. 6; Judge Davis'

Decision, p. 2; Trial Transcript, pp. 169-171, 11. 12-25, 1-25,
1-6) .
10.

On August 30, 1992, prior to trial of this matter, the

parties negotiated and entered into a stipulation of Facts with the
advice and consent of counsel.

The stipulated facts were adopted

by the trial court and incorporated into its Findings of Fact,
Divorce Decree and Decision.

(Findings of Fact, p. 1; Divorce

Decree, p. 1; Judge Davis' Decision, pp. 4-6).
11.

On

August

31,

1992#

the

divorce

proceeding

between

Plaintiff and Defendant came before the lower Court for trial.
only issues before the lower Court were:

The

(1) the award of alimony;

(2) approval of the parties' stipulation of facts entered into on
August 30, 1992; (3) the fair and equitable division of Defendant's
premarital home; and (4) the award of attorneys' fees.
12.
s:\mbf\l5102

The lower Court ruled that:
5

a.

Alimony

is

not

merited

since

Defendant

has

no

reasonable or foreseeable ability to obtain employment nor to
pay alimony due to his unemployment and physical disability.
b.

The parties' August 30, 1992, Stipulation of facts

would be adopted by the Court to resolve all issues relative
to the personal property division and the parties7 financial
obligations.

The parties had negotiated and entered into the

stipulation with the advice of counsel.
c.

Defendant's premarital home did not

increase

in

value since the value of Defendant's premarital home in 1988
plus

the

amount

the

parties

paid

toward

the

remodeling

exceeded the appraised value of the home.
d.

Plaintiff is not entitled to one-half the value of

Defendant's premarital home and that Plaintiff had no life
estate.
e.
actual

Plaintiff

is entitled to be compensated

pre-marriage

and

post-marriage

for her

expenditures

for

remodeling of the home in the stipulated amount of $12,562.65.
f•

Defendant is awarded his attorneys' fees and costs

incurred subsequent to August 12, 1992.
III. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS.
The trial court's decision as to the four issues listed above
should be upheld.

s:\mbf\l5102
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IV.

ARGUMENT.
A.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT
REQUEST FOR ALIMONY.
1.

ERR

IN DENYING

PLAINTIFF # S

This Court Should Not Disturb The Trial Court's
Alimony Ruling Absent Abuse Of Discretion.

This Court has held that trial courts have broad discretion in
awarding alimony.
App.

1990) .

Oscruthorpe v. Osguthorpe, 791 P. 2d 895, 896 (Ut.

As long as a trial court exercises its discretion

within the bounds and under the standards this Court has set and
supports its decision with adequate findings and conclusions, this
Court will not disturb the trial court's ruling.

Narani o v.

Naranio, 751 P. 2d 1144, 1147 (Ut. App. 1988) . The burden of proof
is upon

the plaintiff

discretion

that

a clear

and prejudicial

is shown in the court's decision.

abuse

of

Bridenbaugh

v.

Bridenbaugh, 786 P.2d (Ut. App. 1990).
In awarding alimony, this Court has required trial courts to
consider the following three factors:

(1) the financial conditions

and needs of the receiving spouse; (2) the ability of the receiving
spouse to produce a sufficient income for him or herself; and
(3) the

ability

of

the

responding

spouse

to provide

support.

Rudman v. Rudman, 812 P.2d 73, 78 (Ut. App. 1991); Burt v. Burt,
799 P.2d 1166, 1170 (Ut. App. 1990); Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P.2d
421, 423 (Ut. App. 1990); Munns v. Munns, 790 P.2d 116, 121 (Ut.
App.

1990) .

If these three factors have been considered by the

trial court, this Court will not disturb the trial court's alimony
decision unless a serious inequity has resulted so as to manifest
a

clear abuse

of discretion or manifest

injustice may occur.

Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84 (Utah App. 1989), and Haumont

s:\mbf\l5102
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v. Haumont, 793 P.2d at 424.

See also Watson v. Watson, 194 Utah

Adv. Rep. 42 (Utah App. August 24, 1992).
This Court has further noted that the three-prong criterion
set forth above does not preclude the trial court from considering
other factors such as the length of marriage, the parties 7 ages at
marriage,

whether

children were

born

into

the marriage, etc.

Rapp1eye"v. Rapp1eye, 1993 WL 212747 (Ut. App.); Boyle v. Boyle,
735 P. 2d 669, 671 (Ut. App. 1987) (holding that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in denying alimony to the wife following
a short-term marriage).
Applying these factors to the situation at bar, the trial
court properly denied Plaintiff's request for alimony.
2.

The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion
Because It Addressed All Requisite Factors In
Determining Alimony Was Not Merited.

Plaintiff contends that the trial court abused its discretion
in denying her alimony claim.

Plaintiff argues that the trial

court did not properly consider Defendant's ability to provide
support.

However, contrary to Plaintiff's assertions, the trial

court addressed the above-noted requisite factors in the following
detail.
a.

The trial court considered the circumstances
surrounding
the
parties'
marriage
and
concluded that alimony was not merited.

From the day they were married to the date of their final
separation, the parties were only married for 29 months.

At the

time of their marriage, Plaintiff was 47 years old and Defendant
was

56

years

Defendant's

old.

second.

This

was

Plaintiff's

third

marriage

and

No children were born into the marriage.

(Findings of Fact, p. 2, par. 3-4; Memorandum Decision, pp. 4, 14) .
s.\mbf\15102
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b.

The trial court considered both parties'
abilities to produce income and found that
Plaintiff's ability to produce income exceeds
that of Defendant.

Plaintiff has continuously been employed by Brigham Young
University

in a secretarial position since 1985.

Decision, p. 15; Tr., p. 80, 11. 8-11).

(Memorandum

Plaintiff's wages have

steadily increased during the marriage, and Plaintiff testified
that there is a reasonable expectation that they will continue to
do so.

(Memorandum Decision, p. 15; Tr., p. 81, 1. 23 through p.

82 1. 7 ) .

As of the date of trial, Plaintiff's gross monthly

income was $1,850.00 from which Plaintiff was depositing approximately $27.00 per paycheck, or $54.00 a month, into a B.Y.U.sponsored retirement and savings account.17

It should also be

noted that as of July 1992, one month prior to the date of trial,
Plaintiff was depositing from her gross income approximately $64.75
per

paycheck,

or

$129.50

a

month,

retirement and savings account.

into

her

B.Y.U.-sponsored

(Tr., p. 45, 11. 18-22).

*
In what seems to be an attempt by Plaintiff to confuse the
Court, Plaintiff argues in her Appellant Brief that her income at
the time of marriage was $1,008.58 net per month, that she spent
one-half the sum she received for her son's social security on
behalf of the marriage, and that she liquidated her separate
property assets and paid the proceeds therefrom to her children and
in support of the marital community. Plaintiff's earnings at the
time of marriage and her expenditures during marriage are irrelevant for purposes of an alimony award. Howell v. Howell, 806 P. 2d
1209, 1212 (Utah App. 1991) (holding that trial courts must look to
the standard of living existing at or near the time of trial in
determining alimony). In reaching its determination that alimony
was not warranted in this case, the trial court took notice of both
Plaintiff's and Defendant's incomes and expenses as of the date of
trial.
Plaintiff's above-noted arguments do nothing more than
validate the trial court's findings that the parties' standard of
living during marriage was financed by the liquidation by both
parties of separate property assets and the incurrence of debt.
s:\mbf\15102
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After the parties' final separation, Plaintiff purchased a
condominium,

encumbering herself with a mortgage.

(Memorandum

Decision, p. 3) .lf
Even though Plaintiff may have financial need for support, due
to her younger age and higher salary, Plaintiff
opportunity

and ability

has both the

to recoup her losses and provide

for

herself, while Defendant's age and health may prevent him from
securing steady, full-time employment,

(Memorandum Decision, p.

15) .
c.

The trial court found that Defendant, because
of his physical disabilities, has no reasonably foreseeable ability to obtain employment
and pay alimony.

Defendant has been unemployed in a full-time position since
October 1991 when he was forced to sell his separate property
business at a substantial loss.

(Findings of Fact, p. 6, par. 19;

Memorandum Decision, p. 15; Tr., p. 159, 11. 6-11).

Due to a

slowdown in his business and because of his deteriorating health,
Defendant had no other alternative than to sell his business.
(Memorandum Decision, pp. 2-3; p. 15; Tr., p. 192, 11. 15-20; p.
200, 11. 8-18).
Other than working part-time for a brief period at Utah Valley
Community College, Defendant has remained unemployed.

(Memorandum

-1
Plaintiff claims that, as of trial, she was receiving from her
church monthly food assistance and monies to pay the mortgage on
her condominium. Even if Plaintiff's allegation is true, Plaintiff
fails to take into consideration that Defendant was unemployed at
the time of trial and still is unemployed as of this date, that
Defendant's physical disability precludes him from employment in
his area of expertise, and that Defendant was receiving $500.00 to
$600.00 per month from his children in order to meet his financial
obligations.
(Findings of Fact, p. 6, par. 19; Memorandum
Decision, pp. 2-4).
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Decision, p. 2; Tr., p. 192, 11. 25 through p. 193, 1. 24). Even
though Defendant was withdrawing $1,457.00 in salary a month prior
to the sale of his business, Defendant's income as of the date of
trial, almost 12 months later, was solely that of unemployment
compensation in the amount of $554.00 per month, plus the receipt
of proceeds from the sale of his separate property business in the
amount of $500.00 per month.17

(Findings of Fact, p. 6, par. 19;

Memorandum Decision, p. 2-3; Tr., p. 159, 11. 2-21; p. 172, 11. 818; p. 173, 11. 20-24; p. 175, 11. 11-23).

In order to meet his

monthly financial obligations of $1,370.00, Defendant has had to
borrow $500.00 to $600.00 per month from his children, sell most of
his marketable separate property assets, and incur substantial
debt.17

(Findings of Fact, p. 6, par. 20; Memorandum Decision, pp.

2-3; Tr., p. 161, 11. 7-17; p. 172, 11. 16-19).
As noted above, Defendant suffers from knee problems which
preclude him from seeking full-time employment
training, auto-body repair.

in his area of

(Findings of Fact, p. 6, par. 19;

Memorandum Decision, pp. 2-3, 15; Tr., p. 170, 11. 3-5; p. 193, 1.
25 through p. 195, 11. 1-4).

Furthermore, both of Defendant's

knees were operated on in May 1993.

It is expected that Defendant

^
As the trial court correctly notes in its Findings of Fact and
Memorandum Decision, Defendant's unemployment benefits commenced
the second week of July 1992 and terminated the second week of
January 1993.
(Findings of Fact, p. 6, par. 19; Memorandum
Decision, p. 2-3) . It should also be noted that Defendant received
the last payment from the sale of his business in May 1993.
17

Defendant sold off numerous personal items (a gun collection,
snowmobiles, cars, etc.) and assumed new loans during the marriage
in an attempt to finance the parties' marriage. At the time of
trial, most of Defendant's marketable separate property had been
sold.
(Memorandum Decision, p. 3; Tr., p. 161, 11. 7-17).
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will be immobilized for approximately six months.

(Memorandum

Decision, p. 2; Tr., p. 170, 11. 11-17).
d.

The
trial
court
found
that
Defendant
experienced a higher dollar net worth decrease
than did Plaintiff.

Based on the Stipulation of Facts the parties presented at
trial, and after evaluating the evidence presented at trial, the
trial court found the following facts:
Prior

to

$74,000.00.
p.

5).

the

marriage,

Plaintiff

had

a

net

worth

of

(Findings of Fact, p. 3, par. 7; Memorandum Decision,

During

the

marriage,

Plaintiff

expended

$74,000.00.

(Findings of Fact, p. 5, par. 14; Memorandum Decision, p. 5 ) .
Plaintiff's net worth at the time of the parties' final separation
was $10,539.00 (exclusive of the $12,562.65 the trial court ordered
Defendant to repay to Plaintiff in the Divorce Decree); therefore,
her net decrease was $63,461.00.
Memorandum Decision, p. 5 ) .

(Findings of Fact, p. 5, par. 15;

Plaintiff's net decrease takes into

consideration the following expenditures:
Plaintiff

repaid

(1) prior to marriage

to her parents $18,000.00 on a loan she had

received from them to purchase her premarital home;
marriage,
property

Plaintiff
assets

paid

to her

or

gave

children;

$31,000.00
and

of

(3) prior

her
to

(2) during
separate
and

after

marriage, Plaintiff paid the total sum of $12,562.65 toward the
remodeling of Defendant's premarital home.

(Findings of Fact, p.

3, par. 7; pp. 4-5, par. 12, 14-15; Memorandum Decision, pp. 4-

-7
Subtracting the amount Plaintiff repaid to her parents on the
premarital loan, the amount she paid or gave to her children during
marriage, and the amount Defendant was ordered to repay to her for
her remodeling expenditures, Plaintiff liquidated and expended
s:\mbf\l5102
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On the other hand, Defendant had a net decrease of $135,709.00
during the parties7 marriage.

(Findings of Fact, p. 5, par. 15;

Memorandum Decision, p. 5 ) . Defendant's net worth at the time of
marriage

was

$3 68,000.00.

(Findings of

Fact, p.

3, par.

7;

Memorandum Decision, p. 5) . Defendant expended $109,114.45 during
the marriage.

(Findings of

Fact, p.

5, par.

14; Memorandum

Decision, p. 6 ) . Defendant's net worth at the time of separation
was $232,249.00, and his net decrease was $135,709.00 or double
that of Plaintiff's net decrease.

(Findings of Fact, p. 5, par.

15; Memorandum Decision, p. 5) .
In its thorough consideration of the foregoing factors, the
trial court entered its fact-specific decision.
of discretion in the decision rendered.

There is no abuse

This Court should affirm

the opinion of the trial court and deny Plaintiff's request for
alimony.
3.

Plaintiff Has Failed To Establish That The Trial
Court7 s Findings Are Inecruitable.

The Utah Supreme Court has held that the burden is on the
party challenging the trial court's factual findings to demonstrate
that, even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
trial court, the evidence is insufficient to support the findings
or that the findings are otherwise clearly erroneous.
Bradley, 784 P.2d 1176, 1178 (Ut. 1989) .^

Doelle v.

Plaintiff has failed

to demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient to support the
approximately $1,898.35 from her separate property funds on the
parties' marriage.
-'
Should this Court hold otherwise, this Court would be secondguessing the trial court's reasons for finding as it did without
the advantage of observing witnesses first-hand and assessing their
credibility. Rudman v. Rudman, 812 P.2d 73, 77 (Utah App. 1991) .
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findings.

Plaintiff has also failed to cite any authority which

supports her erroneous contentions.
In her Appellate Brief, Plaintiff argues that the trial court
erred:

(1) in concluding that Defendant's medical

precluded him from performing auto-body work;

disability

(2) in concluding

that Defendant's income was $554.00 a month; and (3) in failing to
take into consideration other factors regarding the parties and
their marriage.

Plaintiff fails to demonstrate any evidence to

support these conclusions.

Plaintiff is mistaken in each and all

of her contentions.
a.
With respect

Defendant's Medical Disability Precluded Him
From Performing Auto-body Work.
to Defendant's medical disability,

Defendant

testified that his doctor informed him that his knees were no
longer functional and that sometime in the near future Defendant
would need to have them replaced.
195, 11. 1-4).

(Tr., p. 193, 1. 25 through p.

Defendant further testified that his knee problem

impaired his ability to find employment.

(Tr., p. 169, 11. 18-20) .

In Boyle, 735 P.2d at 671, this Court held that trial courts
are clearly in the best position to weigh the evidence, determine
credibility, and arrive at factual conclusions.
trial

court

weighed

the

evidence

before

In this case, the

it,

determined

the

credibility of Defendant as a witness, and thereafter concluded
that

Defendant

does

suffer

from

a

physical

disability

which

prohibits him from performing the type of work to which he is
accustomed.

The trial court's finding is also supported by the

fact that Defendant has been unable to procure full-time employment
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in the auto-body industry since the date of trial.

As such, the

trial court's conclusions should not be disturbed.
b.

Defendant's Income Was $554.00 Per Month.

As to Plaintiff's contention that the trial court erred in
determining Defendant's monthly income, this Court has held that
trial courts must determine the parties' standard of living which
existed at or near the time of trial.
1209, 1212 (Utah App. 1991).
the

time

of

Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d

The trial court determined that at

trial, Defendant's

sole

income

was

$554.00

from

unemployment insurance, and that Defendant had no other income.

In

Cummincrs v. Cummincrs, 562 P.2d 229, 231 (Ut. 1977), and Westenskow
v. Westenskow, 562 P. 2d 1256, 1257 (Ut. 1977), the Utah Supreme
Court ruled that a trial court may consider a husband's historical
earning ability only where a husband has experienced a temporary
decrease in income.

The key word in the Cumminqs and Westenskow

decisions is "temporary."

Defendant's decrease was not temporary.

Defendant has been unemployed in his area of expertise since
October 1991, the date he sold his business.

(Findings of Fact,

p. 6, par. 19; Memorandum Decision, p. 15; Tr., p. 159, 11. 6-11).
Even though Defendant was earning $1,457.00 a month, prior to the
sale of his business, Defendant's only income as of the date of
trial, almost 12 months later, was unemployment compensation in the
amount of $554.00 per month.
Memorandum Decision, pp. 2-3).

(Findings of Fact, p. 6, par. 19;
Accordingly, due to Defendant's

physical disability and the fact that Defendant had been unemployed
for close to a year at the time of trial, the trial court properly
concluded that Defendant's historical income was too remote to be
relied upon in determining whether to award Plaintiff alimony.
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As

such, the trial court properly considered Defendant's income at the
time of trial; that was $554.00 per month.
C*

The Trial Court Took Into Consideration Other
Factors Regarding The Parties And Their
Marriage.

Contrary to Plaintiff's contention that the trial court failed
to take into consideration other factors regarding the parties and
their marriage, the trial court's findings clearly demonstrate that
the trial

court

considered:

(1) the length of

the marriage;

(2) the parties' ages upon marriage; (3) the fact that no children
were born into the marriage; (4) that both parties had been married
before;
(6)

(5) the value of both parties' estates upon marriage;

the amount expended by each party during marriage; and (7) the

amount each parties' estate decreased as of their final separation.
In spite of the trial court's above-referenced considerations
and findings, Plaintiff argues that the trial court should have
awarded her alimony

from the equity in Defendant's

home.27

In

support

Sampinos

v.

Sampinos,

of

this
750

factually distinguishable

contention,

P. 2d

616

Plaintiff

(Ut. App.

premarital
relies

1988),

on

a

case

from the circumstances at hand.

In

Sampinos, this Court affirmed the lower court's decision to award
the wife alimony where the wife had not worked for the last eight
years

of the 11-year marriage and had no external source

of

income.

Unlike Plaintiff, the wife in Sampinos had devoted her time as a
homemaker, and she had no professional training and few marketable

2/

Plaintiff fails to take into consideration that the trial
court ordered Defendant to reimburse Plaintiff $12,562.65, the
amount she contributed to the remodeling of the home.
(Divorce
Decree, p. 2, par. 5 ) .
s:\mbf\15l02

16

skills.

Furthermore,

the husband,

ability to support his wife.

unlike

Defendant,

had

the

Id. at 618-19.

In contrast to the facts of the Sampinos case, the trial
court,

after

addressing

all

Plaintiff's claim to alimony.

the

relevant

factors,

denied

The trial court determined that due

to Plaintiff's younger age and higher salary, Plaintiff has an
opportunity and ability to provide for herself and to recoup some
of her losses, in contrast to Defendant, whose age and health may
prevent

him

(Memorandum

from

securing

Decision,

p.

steady,

15).

full-time

Finally,

employment.

because

Defendant's

premarital home is a separate property asset controlled by the
parties'

Antenuptial

Agreement,

Plaintiff

is

not

entitled

to

alimony based on the equity of Defendant's home.
Because

the

trial

court's

findings

are

supported

by

the

evidence before it, and especially in light of the short duration
of the marriage, this Court must conclude that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiff alimony.
B.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING PLAINTIFF'S
REQUEST FOR ONE-HALF OF DEFENDANTS PREMARITAL HOME AND
ORDERING PLAINTIFF TO RECONVEY HER INTEREST IN THE HOME
TO DEFENDANT.

This Court is called upon to determine whether the trial court
abused its discretion in denying Plaintiff's request for one-half
the value of Defendant's premarital home and ordering Plaintiff to
reconvey her interest in the home to Defendant.
Considerable

latitude

is given trial courts

in

adjusting

financial and property interests, and its actions are entitled to
a presumption of validity.
App. 1992).
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property division determination unless there has been a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law, resulting in substantial and
prejudicial error, that the evidence is against the clear weight of
evidence, or such a serious inequity would result as to manifest a
clear abuse of discretion.

Id.

Utah courts have held that upon divorce, each party should
retain the separate property he or she brought into the marriage.
Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314, 1300 (Ut. App. 1990) .

In making a

property division, a trial court should take into consideration all
of the pertinent circumstances of the parties' marriage.
v. Woodward, 656 P. 2d 431, 432

Woodward

(Ut. 1982); Jackson v. Jackson,

617 P. 2d 338, 340-41 (Ut. 1980); English v. English, 565 P.2d 409,
410 (Ut. 1977).
The pertinent circumstances the trial court must consider are:
(1) the duration of the marriage; (2) the parties' ages at the time
of the marriage;
(4) whether

(3) the parties' ages at the time of divorce;

any children were born into the marriage;

(5) the

amount and kind of property to be divided, whether the property was
acquired before or during the marriage and the source of

the

property; (6) the parties' standard of living, respective financial
conditions, needs and earning capacity; and (7) the health of the
parties.

Hogue, 831 P.2d at 121.
1.

The Trial Court Considered All Of The Pertinent
Circumstances Of The Parties' Marriage In Reaching
Its Property Distribution Decision.

In awarding Defendant the entire interest to his premarital
separate property home, the trial court, in its Findings of Fact
and Memorandum Decision, plainly contemplated all of the pertinent
circumstances in formulating an equitable distribution of property
s:\mbf\15102
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between Plaintiff and Defendant.

Specifically, the trial court

noted that the parties had entered into a Stipulation of Facts
which resolved all property disputes except for the division of
Defendant's premarital home.

(Memorandum Decision, p. 8) .

The

trial court adopted the parties' Stipulation of Facts and incorporated

the

same

in

its

Findings

of

Fact, Divorce

Decree

and

Memorandum Decision.
The facts and circumstances the trial court considered in
reaching its decision are set forth in Defendant's Alimony argument
above and herein below.
a.

Defendant brought his unencumbered premarital
home into the marriage.

In 1966, Defendant built the home in question.

Defendant and

his deceased former wife raised nine children in this house and
paid off a 20-year VA mortgage some time in 1987.

In May 1988, to

accommodate Plaintiff and Defendant's sons and daughters, who were
still living at home, the parties' began remodeling Defendant's
premarital home. As of the date of the parties marriage on July 1,
1988, the home and property were unencumbered by mortgage or lien.
(Findings of Fact, p. 2, par. 5; Memorandum Decision, pp. 7 and 14;
Tr., p. 142, 1. 1 through p. 143 11. 1-8).
b.

Plaintiff seeks to obtain a substantially
greater amount of money than she paid toward
the remodeling of Defendant's premarital home.

The amount Plaintiff seeks to obtain is $52,500.00 being onehalf the trial court's determined value of the home.

That demand

substantially

toward

exceeds

the

amount

Plaintiff

paid

the

remodeling of Defendant's premarital home, which was $12,562.65.
(Memorandum Decision, p. 14).
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c.

Prior to the marriage,
premarital residence.

Plaintiff

sold

her

In June 1988, against the advice of Defendant and Plaintiff's
accountant, Plaintiff sold her personal residence to her parents.
From the $21,000.00 proceeds from the sale, Plaintiff repaid her
parents the $18,000.00 she had borrowed from them to purchase the
home.

(Findings of Fact, p. 3, par. 6; Memorandum Decision p. 7;

Tr., p. 145, 1. 9 through p. 146, 1. 14).
d.

Prior to marriage, the parties entered into a
valid Antenuptial Agreement, the parties
intended for Defendant's premarital home to be
protected
under
the
provisions
of
the
Antenuptial Agreement, and the protection
provided by the Antenuptial Agreement was not
abrogated by Defendant's execution of the
Warranty Deed.

In addition to the foregoing facts and circumstances, the
trial

court

also

took

into

consideration

the

circumstances

surrounding the parties execution of an Antenuptial Agreement and
Defendant's execution of a Warranty Deed prior to the date of the
parties' marriage.

Relative to the Antenuptial Agreement, the

Court found the following:
(1)

The

parties

The Antenuptial Agreement executed by the
parties was not
subject
to
fraud#
coercion or material non-disclosure.

entered

into

the

Agreement

upon

Plaintiff's

request, Plaintiff's attorney drafted the Agreement, the parties
were competent, the Agreement was duly signed and notarized, and as
consideration
protected.

therefor,
(Memorandum

both

parties'

Decision,

separate

pp.

8-9) .

property

was

Additionally,

Plaintiff's own attorney signed the Agreement and certified that he
had consulted with Plaintiff and advised her of her property rights
and the legal significance of the Agreement.
s:\mbf\l5102
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(Findings of Fact, p.

4,

par.

10;

Antenuptial

Memorandum

Agreement

Decision,

was not

material non-disclosure.
(2)

p.

subject

9).
to

Accordingly,
fraud,

the

coercion,

or

(Memorandum Decision, p. 8 ) .
Defendant
intended
to
protect
his
separate
premarital
home
under
the
provisions of the Antenuptial Agreement
and
Plaintiff
had
knowledge
of
and
acquiesced to Defendant's intent.

Plaintiff executed the Antenuptial Agreement on June 28, 1988,
and Defendant executed the Antenuptial Agreement on June 30, 1988.
(Findings of Fact, p. 3, par. 8; Memorandum Decision, pp. 8 and 16;
Tr., p. 126, 11. 20-22).

Defendant

intended for his premarital

assets, including his premarital home, to be protected under the
provisions

of

the

Antenuptial

Agreement,

and

Plaintiff

had

knowledge of and acquiesced to Defendant's intent to protect his
premarital

home.

Decision, p. 1 5 ) .
knowledge

of

(Findings

of

Fact, p.

3, par.

8;

Memorandum

Plaintiff admitted during trial that she had

Defendant's

intent

to

include

his premarital

home

under the value of his separate property assets, and this fact was
substantiated by the testimony of Plaintiff's attorney.

(Tr., p.

72, 11. 12-15; p. 129 1. 23 through p. 130, 1. 2 2 ) .
(3)

Nearly

The Warranty Deed was an afterthought by
the parties, and its provisions
are
patently incompatible with the protection
provisions contained in the Antenuptial
Agreement.

contemporaneous

with

the

parties'

signing

Antenuptial Agreement, Defendant executed and placed

of

the

Plaintiff's

name on a Warranty Deed granting Plaintiff a joint interest in his
premarital home.

(Findings of Fact, pp. 3-4, par. 9; Memorandum

Decision, p. 6) . Defendant's intent in executing the Warranty Deed
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was solely to secure only those monies Plaintiff paid or would pay
toward the remodeling of the home.

(Tr., p. 151, 11. 15-22).

Only Plaintiff's attorney advised and counseled the parties
regarding

the execution of the Warranty Deed, and

attorney drafted the Deed.

Plaintiff's

(Findings of Fact, p. 4, par. 10;

Memorandum Decision, p. 6 ) . At no time was Defendant's attorney
present

at

any

of

the meetings

Plaintiff's attorney.

held between

the parties

and

(Findings of Fact, p. 4, par. 10; Memorandum

Decision, p. 7 ) . Plaintiff's attorney, moreover, did not send the
Warranty Deed to Defendant's attorney for his review, nor did
Plaintiff's attorney speak with Defendant's attorney regarding the
Warranty Deed.

(Findings of Fact, p. 4, par. 10; Memorandum

Decision, p. 7 ) .

These facts are substantiated by Plaintiff's

attorney's testimony at the time of trial and the dates and notary
acknowledgments of Defendant's signature on the Warranty Deed and
Antenuptial Agreement.

(Memorandum Decision, p. 16).

Furthermore, the Deed was also drafted and executed with
extreme haste.

The parties were to be married only three days

after Defendant executed the Deed.

(Memorandum Decision, p. 15).

Clearly, the Warranty Deed was an afterthought by the parties, and
its

provisions

are

patently

incompatible

provisions of the Antenuptial Agreement.
par. 11; Memorandum Decision, p. 15).
was clearly

with

the

protection

(Findings of Fact, p. 4,
The Antenuptial Agreement

intended by the parties to protect their separate

property.

That is precisely why they sought the services of an

attorney.

(Findings of Fact, p. 4, par. 11; Memorandum Decision,

p. 15). As such, because Defendant intended to retain the equity
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in

his

premarital

home

as

a

separate

property

asset,

the

Antenuptial Agreement controls this asset.
e.

The post-separation fair market value of
Defendant's premarital home did not exceed the
premarital value of the home plus the parties'
expenditures.

The value of Defendant's premarital home prior to marriage and
prior to remodeling was $77,000.00.

(Findings of Fact, p. 4, par.

12; Memorandum Decision, p. 7) . Of the $29,993.65 the parties paid
toward

the

Defendant
Plaintiff.

remodeling,

expended

Plaintiff

$11,931.00,

(Findings

of

contributed

plus

Fact, pp.

$12,562.65

the

$5,500.00

4-5,

par.

repaid

and
to

12; Memorandum

Decision, p. 4 ) , Other than Plaintiff's remodeling expenditures,
there is no increase in value to attribute to Plaintiff since the
value of Defendant's premarital home in 1988 plus the amount of
monies the parties paid toward the remodeling, or $106,993.65,
exceeds the $105,000.00 fair market value of the home.

(Findings

of Fact, p. 3, par. 7; pp. 4-5, par. 12-13; Memorandum Decision,
pp. 16-17).
The above findings clearly support the trial court's decision
to award Defendant the entire interest in his premarital home and
to reimburse Plaintiff for the amount she contributed toward the
remodeling of the home.

Given the above findings, the trial court

acted well within its discretion in concluding that the house was
Defendant's sole property subject only to Plaintiff's remodeling
expenditure claim.
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2.

Plaintiff

Plaintiff Has Failed To Establish That The Trial
Court Erred In Awarding Defendant The Entire
Interest In His Premarital Home.
argues

that

the

trial

court

erred:

(1)

in

concluding that the Antenuptial Agreement is valid and protects
Defendant's premarital home; (2) in concluding that the protection
provisions of the Antenuptial Agreement were not abrogated as to
Defendant's premarital home when Defendant executed the Warranty
Deed

in favor of Plaintiff and when Plaintiff

expended

monies

toward the remodeling of Defendant's home; (3) in concluding that
it was equitable to return to Defendant the entire interest in his
premarital home and that Plaintiff should be reimbursed for her
remodeling expenditures; (4) in concluding that the home did not
appreciate in value; and (5) in valuing the home as of the date of
separation and not as of the date of the Divorce Decree.
a.

Plaintiff

The trial court properly concluded that the
Antenuptial Agreement is valid and protects
Defendant's premarital home.

argues

for the

first

time on appeal-7 that

the

Antenuptial Agreement is invalid since it fails to disclose which
assets made up Defendant's net worth at the time of marriage,-7
Plaintiff is mistaken in her contention.

-f
It is a well-settled rule in this jurisdiction that evidence
will not be reviewed for the first time on appeal. Munns v. Munns,
790 P.2d 116, 119 (Utah App. 1990). Accordingly, this Court should
strike Plaintiff's argument.
&
Central to Plaintiff's argument is the implied contention that
the burden of proving fair disclosure is upon Defendant, who is
seeking to uphold the agreement.
Plaintiff is mistaken.
Most
jurisdictions have held that the party seeking to avoid an
antenuptial agreement has the burden of proving material nondisclosure.
In re Marriage of Newman, 653 P.2d 728 (Colo. 1982); Del
Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, 143 So.2d 17 (Fla. 1962); In re Estate of
Parish, 236 N.W.2d 32 (1945).
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In Utah, the critical inquiry is whether the agreement was
executed after fair disclosure and whether there is an absence of
fraud or coercion.
App.

D' Aston v. D' Aston, 808 P. 2d 111, 112 (Utah

1990); Berman, 749 P.2d 1271, 1273

defining

the

meaning

of

"fair

(Utah App. 1988).

disclosure"

as

it

relates

In
to

antenuptial agreements, the Colorado Supreme Court in In re Estate
of Lopata, 641 P.2d 952, 955 (Colo. 1982), held as follows:
Fair disclosure
is not synonymous with detailed
disclosure such as a financial statement of net worth and
income. The mere fact that detailed disclosure was not
made will not necessarily be sufficient to set aside an
otherwise properly executed Antenuptial Agreement. Where
the agreement is freely executed, the fact that one party
did not disclose in detail to the other party the nature,
extent, and value of his or her property will not alone
invalidate the agreement or raise a presumption of
fraudulent concealment.
[citation omitted].
Fair
disclosure contemplates that each spouse should be given
information, of a general and approximate nature,
concerning the net worth of the other. Each party has a
duty to consider and evaluate the information received
before signing an agreement since they are not assumed to
have lost their judgmental faculties because of their
pending marriage.
Id. at 955.
Under the Lopata Court's definition of "fair disclosure," the
parties' failure to itemize or list their separate property assets
does not, in and of itself, invalidate an otherwise valid Antenuptial Agreement.

Id.—7

—f
See also In re Marriage of Ross, 670 P.2d 26, 29 (Colo. App.
1983) (holding that husband's failure to disclose value of assets
is insufficient, standing alone, to invalidate an antenuptial
agreement based on nondisclosure); In re Marriage of Stokes,
608 P.2d 824, 827-28 (Colo. App. 1980) (holding that parties'
antenuptial agreement was valid, even though valuation of husband's
assets set forth therein was only an approximation, and husband had
failed to supply itemized list of assets) ; Laird v. Laird, 597 P. 2d
463, 467-68 (Wyo. 1979) (holding that antenuptial agreement was not
invalid even though wife allegedly failed to disclose her assets
prior to execution of agreement).
s \mbf\l5102

25

In

this

case,

Plaintiff

has

failed

to

proffer

evidence

establishing fraud, coercion, or material nondisclosure on the part
of Defendant.

Thus, Plaintiff has failed to meet her burden of

proof.
In

addition,

surrounding

the

Plaintiff

execution

contained in the Agreement.

of

disregards
the

the

Agreement

and

circumstances
the

language

Recital "C" of the Agreement states:

Each of the parties has made a full disclosure to the
other party of all of his or her property and assets and
of the value thereof, and this Agreement is entered into
with a full knowledge on the part of each as to the
extent and probable value of the estate of the other, and
of all the rights conferred by law on each in the estate
of the other by virtue of such proposed marriage.

Additionally, Article 9 of the Agreement

recites

language

similar

to that set forth in Recital "C" and establishes the approximate
value of each party's separate property assets.
By executing the Agreement, Plaintiff certified that she had
full knowledge of the nature, extent, and value of Defendant's
premarital separate property. Additionally, prior to executing the
Agreement, Plaintiff's attorney advised her of her property rights
and the legal significance and meaning of the Agreement.

(Findings

of Fact, p. 4, par. 10; Memorandum Decision, p. 9; Tr., p. 70,
11. 6 - n ) .

Plaintiff also testified that she had knowledge of

Defendant's intent to protect his premarital home,

as well

as

his

other separate property assets, under the provisions and values set
forth in the Antenuptial Agreement.

(Findings of Fact, p. 3, par.

8; Memorandum Decision, p. 15; Tr., p. 72, 1. 12 through p. 73, 1.
4) .

This

fact

was

Plaintiff's attorney.

also

substantiated

the

testimony

of

(Tr., p. 72, 11. 12-15; p. 129 1. 23 through

p. 130, 1. 22).
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In Berman, 749 P. 2d at 1273, this Court held that antenuptial
agreements are to be construed and treated in the same manner as
other contracts.

The ordinary and usual meaning of the words used

is given effect, and effect is to be given to the entire agreement
without ignoring any part thereof.

Giving effect to the language

of the Antenuptial Agreement entered into by the parties, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that the Antenuptial
Agreement was valid.

The evidence clearly shows that prior to

marriage, Plaintiff had knowledge of the nature, extent, and value
of Defendant's separate property assets.

Furthermore, Plaintiff

knew that Defendant intended to protect his premarital home under
the Antenuptial Agreement.

Finally, Plaintiff has failed to meet

her burden of proof and demonstrate that Defendant fraudulently
concealed his assets.

Accordingly, the factual situation present

here does not justify disturbing the trial court's determination
and undoing what the parties contractually agreed to accomplish in
their Antenuptial Agreement.
b.

Plaintiff

The trial court properly concluded that the
protection provisions of the Antenuptial
Agreement were not abrogated as to Defendant's
premarital home.

next argues that the Antenuptial Agreement

was

abrogated as to Defendant's premarital home when Defendant executed
a Warranty Deed in favor of Plaintiff and when Plaintiff expended
her separate property monies to remodel Defendant's home.
In reaching its decision that Plaintiff was not entitled to a
one-half interest in Defendant's premarital home, the trial court
held

that

the

Antenuptial

Agreement

was

not

abrogated

when

Defendant executed a Warranty Deed in favor of Plaintiff and when
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Plaintiff

expended

her

separate

property

monies

to

remodel

Defendant's home.
While Utah courts have not directly addressed the question of
whether a Warranty Deed with rights of survivorship,

executed

subsequent to an antenuptial agreement, abrogates the terms and
provisions of the antenuptial agreement, another jurisdiction has
confronted this very issue.

In Peet v. Monger, 56 N.W.2d 589 (Iowa

1953), the parties entered into an antenuptial agreement prior to
their marriage.

Subsequent

to the parties' execution

of

the

antenuptial agreement, the wife executed a joint tenancy deed which
contained no language expressly affecting the cancellation of the
antenuptial agreement.

The Iowa Supreme Court upheld the lower

court's decision by finding that, under the antenuptial agreement,
the husband had no interest in or control over the joint tenancy
property unless he survived the wife.

See also. In Re: Marriage of

van Brocklin, 468 N.W.2d 40 (Iowa App. 1991).
In the case at hand, the Warranty Deed is void of language
expressly

canceling

the

Antenuptial

Agreement.

(Memorandum

Decision, p. 10) . In fact, the Deed expressly states that the Deed
is subject to all existing covenants of whatever nature.

(See

Warranty Deed and Memorandum Decision, p. 10). Additionally, the
Antenuptial Agreement existed at the time the Warranty Deed was
executed,

and

Plaintiff

had

knowledge

that

the

Antenuptial

Agreement she executed on June 28, 1988, attempted to control and
preserve

the

same

property

covered

by

the

Warranty

Deed.

(Memorandum Decision, p. 10).
Accordingly, under the Peet decision, and pursuant to the
language of the Warranty Deed, the trial court did not abuse its
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discretion

in

determining

that

Defendant's

execution

of

the

Warranty Deed did not abrogate the protection provisions afforded
his premarital home under the Antenuptial Agreement.
Plaintiff

next

argues

that

the Antenuptial

Agreement

was

abrogated when she liquidated and expended her separate property
monies on the remodeling of Defendant's premarital home.
In affirming the trial court's decision, this Court held in
Rudman v. Rudman, 812 P.2d 73, 77-79

(Ut. App. 1991), that even

though a wife had contributed labor and/or assets to her husband's
premarital property, the property was not converted to marital
property since the parties had entered into a prenuptial agreement.
Like the wife in Rudman, Plaintiff claims that the trial court
abused its discretion in failing to find that she contributed labor
and/or assets to Defendant's premarital home, thus converting it to
marital property.

Also, like the wife in Rudman, Plaintiff fails

to give due regard to the Antenuptial Agreement she entered into
with Defendant.
In the case at hand, the trial court found that even though
Plaintiff had contributed labor and/or assets toward the remodeling
of Defendant's premarital home, the home was not converted to
marital property, as Plaintiff contends, since the parties had
entered

into a valid Antenuptial Agreement prior to marriage.

(Memorandum Decision, p. 11) .
Recital "E" of the Antenuptial Agreement expressly provides:
Each of
dispose
or her
parties
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Clearly, by executing the Antenuptial Agreement, the parties
contractually

retained

the right to dispose of their

separate

property by contributing the same in support of the other spouses'
property.

Accordingly, the trial court's determination that the

Antenuptial Agreement was not abrogated when Plaintiff contributed
her separate property assets toward the remodeling of Defendant's
premarital home must be upheld.
the

fact

that

the trial

This is especially true in view of

court ordered Defendant

to

reimburse

Plaintiff for her remodeling expenditures.
c«

It was equitable for the trial court to compel
Plaintiff to reconvey title to Defendant's
premarital
home
and order Defendant
to
reimburse
Plaintiff
for
her
remodeling
expenditures.

Even if we were to assume that the trial court erred in
determining the validity of the Antenuptial Agreement, this Court
must still place a presumption of validity on the trial court's
equitable property distribution.

Hogue, 831 P.2d at 121.

Utah courts have held that equity requires that each party
recover the separate property he or she brought into the marriage.
Burke

v.

Burke,

733

P.2d

Georgedes, 627 P.2d 44, 45

133, 135

(Ut.

1987);

Georgedes

v.

(Ut. 1981); Jesperson v. Jesperson,

610 P.2 326, 328 (Ut. 1988); Lundgreen v. Lundgreen, 184 P.2d 670
(Ut. 1947).

To this end, trial courts are not bound by the state

of title to real property prior to the issuance of a divorce decree
and are empowered to make distributions and compel conveyances as
are just and equitable.

Georgedes, 627 P. 2d at 45; Jackson v.

Jackson, 617 P.2d 338, 340-41 (Ut. 1980); Jesperson, 610 P.2d at
328; Lundgreen, 184 P.2d at 670.
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In determining that it was equitable to compel Plaintiff to
reconvey title to Defendant's premarital home and order Defendant
to reimburse Plaintiff for her remodeling expenditures, the trial
court considered all the pertinent circumstances surrounding the
parties' marriage and, thereafter, looked to such landmark cases as
Georcredes, 627 P.2d 44, Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326, and Lundgreen,
184 P.2d 670.
exists

The trial court found that a common factual theme

between

those

cases

and

the

case

at

hand.

In

each

situation, the parties were married for less than seven years, no
children were born into the marriage, both parties had been married
before, one of the parties either brought a premarital home into
the marriage or the home was purchased with that party's separate
funds, title to the home was placed in joint tenancy within the
first year of marriage, and the other party allegedly contributed
labor,

income

and/or

assets

to

remodel

or

improve

the

home.

(Memorandum Decision, p. 15).
In the case at bar, the trial court did not misunderstand or
misapply the applicable law.

The trial court's property distribu-

tion was predicated on facts similar to those found in other Utah
Supreme Court cases.

Furthermore, the trial court's decision that

Defendant should be awarded his premarital home and order requiring
Defendant to reimburse Plaintiff for her remodeling expenditures is
not against

the clear weight of evidence.

The trial

court's

findings were detailed and clearly supported by the evidence.
Finally, an abuse of discretion and serious inequity would have
resulted

in

this

case

had

the

trial

court

ruled

otherwise.

Clearly, the trial court's equitable property distribution must be
upheld.
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d.

The trial court properly concluded that
Defendant's premarital home did not appreciate
in value.

Under the rationale of the Utah Supreme Court in Georgedes,
627 P.2d at 45, Jesperson, 610 P.2d at 328, and Lundgreen, 184 P.2d
at 670, where one of the parties contributes separate property
assets to remodel or improve a home brought into the marriage by
the other spouse, and title to the home is placed in joint tenancy
within the first year of marriage, it is equitable to return to the
spouse who contributed their separate property assets to remodel or
improve the other spouse's premarital home, their actual remodeling
or improvement expenditures plus one-half of the increase in value
to the property if such increase exists.
In the case at hand, the trial court held that Defendant's
premarital home in 1988, prior to the parties' marriage and any
improvements, was $77,000.00.
Memorandum Decision, p. 7 ) .
toward

the

Defendant

remodeling,
expended

Plaintiff.

(Findings of Fact, p. 4, par. 12;
Of the $29,993.65 the parties paid

Plaintiff

$11,931.00

(Findings

of

contributed

plus

Fact, pp.

the
4-5,

$12,562.65

$5,500.00
par.

repaid

and
to

12; Memorandum

Decision, p. 4 ) . Other than Plaintiff's remodeling expenditures,
there is no increase in value to attribute to Plaintiff since the
value of Defendant's premarital home in 1988 plus the amount of
monies the parties paid toward the remodeling, or $106,993.65,
exceeds the $105,000.00 fair market value of the home.

(Findings

of Fact, p. 3, par. 7; pp. 4-5, par. 12-13; Memorandum Decision,
pp. 16-17).
The trial court's determination that there is no increase in
value

beyond
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expenditures

is

clearly

supported by the evidence.

Therefore, the trial court did not err

in its decision.
e.

The trial court properly valued Defendant's
premarital home as of the date of the parties'
separation.

In Plaintiff's last point of error, she contends that the
trial court committed reversible error in relying on her appraisal,
to valuate Defendant's premarital home as of the date of

the

parties' separation, rather than the date of trial.
In Morgan v. Morgan, 1993 WL 176214 (Ut. App.), this Court
held that while the marital estate is generally valued at the time
of trial, such is not an intractable rule.

In Morgan, the court

was called upon to determine whether the trial court had abused its
discretion in valuing bank accounts prior to the parties' divorce.
Id. at page 3.

At trial, the husband failed to offer into evidence

more recent bank statements to rebut the evidence the trial court
relied on in valuing the property.

In upholding the trial court's

valuation of the property, this Court stated that since there was
sufficient reliable evidence to support the trial court's finding
regarding the pre-trial valuation of the bank accounts, as well as
the husband's failure to provide any documentation to rebut such
evidence, the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

Like the

facts of Morgan, there is sufficient evidence in the case at hand
to support the trial court's valuation of Defendant's premarital
home at a time other than trial.
After their separation in 1990, both parties had Defendant's
premarital home appraised.
at

Plaintiff's appraisal valued the home

$105,000.00, and Defendant's

$89,000.00.
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valued

the

home

at

Furthermore, the day prior

to trial, the parties executed a Stipulation of Facts.

In the

Stipulation, the parties expressly agreed to allow the trial court
to use either of the appraisals to determine the net worth and
decrease of Defendant's separate property assets during marriage.
(Memorandum Decision, p. 5, Stipulation, par. 5) .

The parties

intended for the trial court to rely on and utilize either parties'
appraisal in determining the value of Defendant's premarital home.
This fact is substantiated by Plaintiff's testimony at trial and
the closing argument of her attorney.
p. 28, 1. 8; p. 216, 11. 6-21).

(Tr., p. 27, 1. 25 through

In reaching its decision that the

value of Defendant's premarital home was $105,000.00 as reflected
in Plaintiff's

appraisal, the trial court

relied

on the

only

evidence presented at trial, the parties' appraisals.
Similar to the facts of Morgan, Plaintiff failed to offer into
evidence an appraisal valuing the home as of trial.

Like the

husband in Morgan, Plaintiff now comes before this Court and claims
"foul play," only after she realized that the trial court did not
rule

in

her

favor by

awarding

Defendant's premarital home.
sufficient

evidence

her

one-half

of

the

value

of

Like the facts in Morgan, there is

in the case at hand to support

the trial

court's valuation of the property at a time other than trial.

This

is especially true in view of the fact that the trial court adopted
and relied on Plaintiff's appraisal in valuating the home.
It should also be noted that Plaintiff cites no authority for
the proposition that a trial court may not consider appraisals made
prior to the date of trial in valuing real property.

While this

Court has yet to address this exact question, other jurisdictions
which normally require marital property to be valuated at the time
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of trial have held that appraisals made before the date of trial
may be used to determine the value of marital real property.

Finch

v. Finch, 825 S.W.2d 218, 223 (Tex.App. 1992) (holding trial court
did not abuse its discretion in relying on an appraisal made one
year prior
purposes

to date

of

of

dividing

divorce, in valuing
marital

property);

real property
In

re

for

Marriage

of

Feisthamel, 739 P. 2d 474, 479 (Mont. 1987) (holding trial court did
not abuse its discretion in adopting wife's appraised value of the
marital home, where appraisal was performed two years prior to
trial).

Furthermore, whether an appraisal is near enough in time

to the date of divorce to be considered in determining the value of
the property is a question which should be left to the discretion
of the trial court.

In Re Marriage of Feisthamel, 739 P. 2d at 479.

Accordingly, under the Morgan, Finch and Feisthamel decisions,
similar to the facts of Morgan, Plaintiff failed to profer evidence
at trial which would rebut the evidence before the court, the
parties' appraisals.

Like the husband in Morgan, Plaintiff now

comes before this Court and claims "foul play," only after she has
realized that the trial court did not rule in her favor by awarding
her one-half of the value of Defendant's premarital home.

Like

Morgan, there is sufficient evidence in the case at hand to support
the trial court's valuation of the property at a time other than
trial.
Accordingly, this Court must hold that the trial court did not
err in valuing Defendant's premarital home at a time other than the
date of trial.
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C.

THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN AWARDING DEFENDANT
ATTORNEYS' FEES, AND DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF
ATTORNEYS' FEES ON APPEAL.

In her Appellate Brief, Plaintiff mistakingly argues that
there is no other basis for the trial court's award of attorneys'
fees to Defendant than Plaintiff's failure to accept Defendant's
offer of judgment.
Under Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-3 (1989), a court may award
attorneys' fees in a divorce proceeding, as long as the award is
based on evidence as to the receiving spouses' financial need, the
ability of the paying spouse to pay the fees, and the reasonableness of

the

(Ut. 1988).

award.

Rasband v. Rasband,

752

P.2d

1331, 1336

Furthermore, the decision to make such an award and

the amount thereof rests primarily in the sound discretion of the
trial court.

Id. at 1336.

Contrary to Plaintiff's representations, the facts in this
case

adequately

supports

Defendant attorneys' fees.
found:

the

trial

court's

decision

to

award

In pertinent part, the trial court

(1) Defendant has been unemployed in a full-time position

since October 1991

(Findings of Fact, p. 6, par. 19; Memorandum

Decision, p. 15; Tr., p. 159, 11. 6-11); (2) that as of the time of
trial, Defendant was not able to meet his financial obligations and
was borrowing

$500.00

to $600.00 per month

from his

children

(Findings of Fact, p. 6, par. 20; Memorandum Decision, pp. 2-3;
Tr., p. 161, 11. 7-17; p. 172, 11. 16-19; and (3) that Defendant
suffers from knee problems which preclude him from seeking fulltime employment in his area of training, auto-body repair (Findings
of Fact, p. 6, par. 19; Memorandum Decision, pp. 2-3, 15; Tr., p.
170, 11. 3-5; p. 193, 1. 25 through p. 195, 11. 1-4).
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Additionally, Defendant's attorneys submitted Affidavits in
support of the reasonableness of the attorneys' fees generated on
the case.

(Memorandum Decision, p. 18).

It should be noted that

the amount requested by Defendant's attorneys were only a portion
of the fees and costs Defendant incurred during the case.
Based on the foregoing, the trial court found that the amounts
set forth in the Affidavits were fair and reasonable under the
circumstances; $2,360.00 for the legal services of Mr. Peel and
$2,289.00 for the legal services rendered by Ms. Brown.

Accord-

ingly, the trial court ordered Plaintiff to pay to Defendant's
attorneys the sum of $4,649.00.

(Memorandum Decision, p. 18).

Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering
Plaintiff to pay only a portion of Defendant's attorneys' fees.
Additionally, this Court has held that when fees in a divorce
case have been awarded below, fees may be awarded to that party who
then substantially prevails on appeal. Bell v. Bell, 810 P. 2d 489,
494 (Ut. App. 1991), and Crouse v. Crouse, 817 P.2d 836 (Utah App.
1991).

In the case at bar, Defendant was awarded attorneys' fees

below and upon substantially prevailing on appeal, Defendant should
be awarded the attorneys' fees he has incurred on appeal.
V.

CONCLUSION.
For the foregoing reasons, the rulings of the trial court in

this matter should be affirmed, and this Court should enter an
order awarding Defendant his attorneys' fees and costs on appeal.
DATED this

day of July, 1993.

M. Byron Fisher
FABIAN & CLENDENIN,
a Professional Corporation
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this
day of July, 1993, I
caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of
BRIEF OF APPELLEE to:
Mary C. Corporon, Esq.
Attorney for Plaintiff
310 South Main Street, Suite 1400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

S.\mbf\l5l02

38

